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ABSTRACT
This paper analyzes the joy of giving bequest motive in which the utility
obtained from leaving a bequest depends only on the size of the bequest. It
exploits the fact that this formulation can be interpreted as a reduced form
of an altruistic bequest motive to derive a relation between the value of' the
altruism parameter and the value of the joy of giving parameter. Using
previous discussions of an a priori range of plausible values for the altruism
parameter we then derive plausible restrictions on the joy of giving
parameter. We demonstrate that this parameter may well be orders of' magnitude
larger than assumed in the existing literature.
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Philadelphia, PA 19104Bequest motives by individual consumers have important implications for
the behavior of financial markets, the macroeconomic impacts of various fiscal
policies and the intergenerational transmisssion of inequality in the
distribution of wealth. There are at least four reasons for the existence of
bequests which have been discussed in the recent literature: (1) bequests may
be the unintentional by-product of precautionary savings and a stochastic date
of death in the absence of' an annuity market (Abel (1985)); (2) the prospect
of bequests is used by parents to induce children to behave in certain ways
desired by the parents (Bernheim, Shleifer, and Summers (1985)); (3) bequests
may arise from intergenerational altruism, that is, consumers obtain utility
from their heirs' utility as well as from their own consumption (Barro (19714)
and Becker (19714)); and (14) bequests may arise from what may be termed the
"joy of giving," that is, consumers leave bequests simply because they obtain
utility directly from the bequest.
For some theoretical and empirical analyses of the issues affected by
voluntary intergenerational transfers, the specification of the bequest motive
is critical. For example, the validity of the Ricardian Equivalence Theorem
depends crucially on an altruistic motive rather than a joy of giving
motive. For many other purposes, however, the specification is not crucial.
Many economists, including Yaari (1965), Hakansson (1969), Fischer (1973), and
Abel (1986), have chosen the joy of giving model, either out of the belief
that it captures the true reason for bequests, or more likely, because it is a
convenient "reduced form" representation of altruistic preferences.
Furthermore, the joy of giving formulation has the practical advantage that it
is more easily tractable. This tractability is especially important in
simulation models, particularly those simulation models in which closed-form
solutions are needed.
1.3.1—2—
In most applications of the altruism model and the joy of giving model,
the bequest motive is parameterized by a small number of parameters. Economic
theory provides substantial guidance on the admissible, or at least plausible,
values of' the parameters in the simple formulations of the altruism model and
these implications have been discussed by Drazen (1978), Burbidge (1983,
198)4), Buiter and Carmichael (198)4), and Weil (1984). However, there has
evidently been no systematic discussion of the range of appropriate parameter
values for simple formulations of the joy of giving model, despite the
popularity of this formulation in empirical work.
The purpose of this paper is to explore the implications of economic
theory for the appropriate range of parameter values for a popular
specification of the joy of giving motive. The strategy pursued in this paper
is to assume that the bequest is actually motivated by altruism and then to
use the well—known restrictions on a simple formulation of the altruism model
to derive restrictions on the parameter of a simple form of the joy of giving
model. A striking result of this analysis is that the weight on the utility
obtained directly from a bequest may be orders of magnitude larger than the
values which appear in the literature (Fischer (1973), Blinder (1974)).
I. A Model of Individual Behavior
We consider consumers who live for L periods. For now, we suppose that
the only source of disposable income is from past accumulation, that is,
consumers receive only property income. This assumption will be relaxed in
Section V. We consider a family in which J periods elapse between the birth
of successive generations. For simplicity, we assume that private
intergenerational transfers from parent to child, that is, bequests, are made
at the beginning of the child's life. Let J be the wealth received by a
generation j consumer at the beginning of his life. Defining c,
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1 1, ..., Las the consumption of a generation j consumer when he is age
i, and letting R be the (gross) rate of return on the homogeneous wealth, we
can write the lifetime budget constraint as a relation between the inheritance





We specify the utility function to be time separable in the consumer's
own consumption and to display altruism. Letting V be the present value of
lifetime utility of the generation j consumer we assume that the consumer has
the following time—separable altruistic utility function
V max 3u(c) + (2)
where u' > 0, u" < 0, 8 is discount factor reflecting time preference
(0 < 8 < 1) and a > 0 indicates the strength of the bequest motive. The
maximization in (2) is subject to the constraint in (1) and to the
transversality condition urn R...NJWJ ? 0.
It has been noted by several authors (for example, Buiter and Carmichael
(198)4), and Weil (1985)) that in order for the maximization problem in (2) to
be well—posed, we must restrict the weight on the heir's utility, 81a, to lie
between 0 and 1. This restriction does not require a to be less than or equal
to 1. To obtain some guidance on the appropriate range of' values for a, it is
useful to define the term "full altruism." By "full altruism" we will mean
that in every period in which both the generation j consumer is alive and the
generation j +1consumer is alive, the optimal allocation of family
consumption is for the parent and child to have equal consumption
1.3.1_14 —
(cjL1
i 1,..., L —N).With the specification of the utility
function in (2), full altruism corresponds to a 1.If a < 1 then we will
say that the utility function displays less than fullaltruism.1
If all generations in an infinitely—lived altruistic family are identical
except for their dates of birth and the inheritances they receive at birth,
then the utility of the generation j consumer can be written as a function of
the inheritance received at birth v V(W). Therefore equation (2) may be
written as
V(W) max {L B1u(c) +BNV(WJ+l)} (3)
Recalling that WJ1 is the bequest left by the generation j consumer, equation
(3) expresses the utility of the generation j consumer as a function of his
own consumption and the bequest he leaves. That is, equation (3) has the
appearance of a "joy of giving" bequest motive. Strictly speaking, it is not
a joy of giving bequest motive because the function V( ) cannot be specified
independently; it is the solution to a functional equation. The strategy we
will employ in this paper is to solve the functional equation implied by
altruism and to use interpretable restrictions on altruistic preferences to
derive restrictions on the parameters of the joy of giving specification.
We begin by solving the maximization problem on the right-hand side of
(3) subject to (1) and a given value of W. The first-order conditions can be
expressed
u'(c) (R)1uI(c) ,i 2, .. ., L ('4a)
u'(c)(RB)NczVt(W3) (ib)
It is useful to obtain an expression for V'(W) in terms of the utility
function u( ).It follows immediately from the envelope theorem that
1.3.1-5—
u'(c1) (5)
Finally, use (14a, b) and (5) to obtain an expression relating consumption at a
given age i across successive generations
u'(c?)ci(BR)Nu(cl) I 1, ... , L (6)
II. Implications for the Steady State
In this section we briefly analyze the life-cycle consumption pattern of
an individual and the cross-sectional distribution of consumption in the
steady state. To analyze the steady state, we assume that there are N types
of families of consumers which are identical in all respects except for the
dates at which births (and deaths) occur. We assume that there is an equal
numberof each type of family so that there is a constant number of consumers
born each period.
A steady state is characterized by c c1,i1, .. ., Land
W1. It follows from (6)thatin the steady state
=1 (7)
Although ci and @ are preference parameters and R is assumed to be given to the
individual, a more complete aggregate analysis could specify R to be a
declining function of the aggregate capital stock. Such a formulation, which
would allow for the endogenous adjustment of R to the steady state value
implied by (7), is beyond the scope of this paper. Our purpose here is simply
to characterize the life-cycle and cross-sectional profiles of consumption.
We observe that under full altruism (ci= 1),condition (7) implies that
SR =1.It is thus apparent from ('4a) and (6) that both the life-cycle and
cross-sectional profiles of consumption are flat. That is, in the steady
state c =C forall i and j where c >0is constant.
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The steady state behavior of consumption is more interesting in the case
of less than full altruism. In this case, with a < 1, condition (7) implies
that RB > 1. With the rate of interest greater than the rate of time
preference (R > (14a) implies that the path of optimal consumption over
an individual's lifetime is monotonically increasing with age. Every consumer
has the same lifetime path of consumption, and in a cross—section at a point
in time old consumers have higher consumption than young consumers. Thus, in
every period in which two successive generations in a family are alive, the
parent's consumption exceeds the child's consumption, which is simply a
reflection of less than full altruism.
III. One-Period Non-Overlapping Generations
Before deriving the utility function corresponding to the joy of giving
motive in the general multi-period life case, it is useful to analyze the
simple case with LN1 and to focus on the steady state. This simple case
gives the flavor of the result that the weight on the joy of giving function
may be quite large, and does so without a burdensome amount of algebra.
With LN1, we can write constraint (1) in the steady state as
Wc +R1W (8)
where c
c' in the steady state. Evaluating the utility function (2)
in the steady state yields
Vu(c) +aBV (9)
Now using (8) to substitute for c in (9) and using (7) to replace c&8 by R1,
we can rewrite (9) as
(10)
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Equation (10) expresses the steady state utility of an individual as a
function of the inheritance he receives at birth. Much of the research using
the joy of giving motive assumes that u(c) is isoelastic
1 1—a
u(c) 1 —c (11)
In addition, the joy of giving function is assumed to be isoelastic with
the same elasticity as u(c). This formulation of the joy of giving function
is consistent with (10) as may be seen by combining (10) and (11) to obtain
v R 1 W° (12) R—11—a
Observing thatR 1> 1, we see that '
1) the weight on the joy of
giving function, might be quite large. To determine how large this weight
might be, we must go to the more general model which can accommodate more
realistic values for L and N.
IV. The Multi-Period Model
In this section, we allow both N and L to be large and we calculate the
function V(W3) under the assumption that u(c) has the isoelastic form in
(11). We will verify that under isoelastic utility, the solution to the
functional equation in (3) has the form
V(W)
1 a1° (13)
where • is the weight to be derived in this section.
Using the expressions for u(c) and V(W) in (11) and (13), respectively,




i 2, ..., L (1'4a)
w' [(RB)NajG c (14b)
Using (114a) to substitute for c', 1 2, ..., Land (14b) to substitute for






rz [R Bdlui (15c)
1=1
Next use (1!a) and (114b) to substitute for c, i 2, ..., Land
in the functional equation (3).Usingthe specifications of u(c) and V(W) in
(11) and (13), respectively, we obtain
(c)1° V(W) 1 - (16)
Now use (15a) to express the right-hand side of (16) as a function of and
use (13) to rewrite the left—hand side of (16) to obtain
____ (.J)la
(17)





The expression forin (18) was derived without assuming that thesteady
state condition (7) holds and thus is not restricted tosteady states. Note
that in the steady state we obtain2
r
N' when a(5R) 1 (19) 1-R
In order to make our findings more easily interpretable in termsof, for
example, Fischer (1973), note that under isoelastic utility, theutility
function in (3) can be written as
V(W) {i_l(CJ)1_a+X(W)}/(l-c) (20a)
where A (20b)
We have defined A so that it is comparable to the bequestweight bt in Fischer





If we restrict our attention to the steady state, then (21)can be simplified
using (7) to obtain
R_N
r
N ifa(8R)N 1 (22)
1 -R
Table 1 presents the implied values of A andcorresponding to various
rates of time preference and steady state interest rates. Lookingacross the
last four columns of each row, it is clear that the weight A isan increasing
1.3.1-10-
function of the coefficient of relative risk aversion o. The striking result
in Table 1 is that even with a coefficient of relative risk aversion as low as
2, the value of xcanbe orders of magnitude larger than the values assumed by
previous authors. For example, Table 1 of Fischer (1973) indicates that for
four sets of his simulations, Fischer used a rate of time preference of .014
(actuallyB .96),anet interest rate of .06, and a coefficient of relative
risk aversion of 2.0. Although he uses a time-varying weight on the bequest
motive, this weight is roughly equal to 1 (it always lies between .142 and
1.20). The first row of Table 1 indicates that for o0.5 a value of X
around 1 is consistent with altruism but for o2, a value of X around 100 is
required to be consistent with altruism in the steady state.
The calculations reported in Table 1 are limited to the steady state in
which condition (7) implies a restriction on B, R and ci.Ifwe relax the
assumption that we are in a steady state, then ci can be specified
independently of B and R. We can use this extra degree of freedom on the
parameters to answer the following question: given a time preference discount
factor B, a gross interest rate R, and a bequest weight A, what is the implied
degree of altruism ci? Straightforward manipulation of (21) yields
ci(BR){R+(RMX)0r} (23)
It is clear from (23) that for given R and B there is a monotonically
increasing relation between ciandA. However, this relation is nonlinear. In
Table 2 we report values ofcorresponding to R 1.06, —1 .04 and
various values of a and A. The last entry in Table 2 indicates that the
implied degree of altruism in Fischer (1973) is quite small relative to full
altruism for the case with a 2.
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V.Non-Property Income
In previous sections we have assumed that the only source of disposable
resources is wealth inherited at birth. In this section we assume that a
generation j consumer receives an exogenous deterministic income y when he is
age i.
Let ii denote the inheritance of tangible (non-human) assets received at
L .
birthby the generation j consumer and let =ER' 'y denote the value
1=1
of the human wealth of the generation j consumer. Now let H1 be the present




Next, let Wi now denote the total wealth, human plus non-human, of the
generation j consumer and his descendents, as of the beginning of the
generation j consumer's life,
W1=11+H1 (25)
Finally, let Bi denote the bequest left by a generation J consumer so
that I' B1. Therefore, equation (25) implies that
=B3+H11 (26)
The analysis of previous sections continues to apply if we now interpret
Wi to include human as well as non-human wealth. Inparticular, we can write
the isoelastic altruistic utility function in (20a) as
V(W1){z 81(c)1 +x(B1+H11)1}/(1-a) (27)
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Equation (27) expresses the utility of the generation j consumer as a
function of his own consumption c ,i 1, .. ., Land the bequest he makes,
BJ. This equation is equivalent to a joy of giving formulation. Unlike the
joy of giving functions in Abel (1986), Blinder (1971), Fischer (1973),
Friedman and Warshawsky (1985), Hakansson (1969), and Richard (1975), however,
it is not isoelastic, although the period utility function u( ) is
isoelastic. Treating the exogenous human wealth term HJ as a parameter, the
joy of giving function is a member of the more general HARA class of utility
functions.
In terms of consumer behavior, it is, of course, the marginal utility
function rather than the utility function per se which is important. In the
altruistic formulation in (27) the marginal utility of leaving a bequest is
(28)
aB3




Nowconsider a joy of giving specification of the bequest motive. If, as
is typical in the joy of giving framework, the bequest motive is specified to




where X is the weight on the bequest motive. In order to calibrate X so
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that the calculated marginal utility in (30) would equal the marginal utility
in (29), we would equate the right-hand sides of (29) and (30) to obtain
1j+1 M r(TJ+h/I1J+l\
•ja
' / / (31)
WJ+l
(8NRN) a —R_N
The second equality in (31) follows from (21). Of course, the adjustment
1j+1
factor (•1jain (31) depends on the bequest B. However, since the goal of
WJ
this adjustment is merely to choose an appropriate magnitude for X in
empirical and simulation work, some rough proxies for may be used
such as the population average ratio of inheritances to total wealth, or a
particular family's (or group of families') historical average value of this
j+1 j+1 ratio. At this level of analysis, all we can say is that I < W so that
X" < A where A is given by (20a). Put differently, the parameter a of the
altruistic bequest motive corresponding to a particular value of X is larger
than the a corresponding to the same value of A in the model without human
wealth. We can, using (31), calculate the value of a corresponding to a given
value of A' as
(BR)N{R +(13+l/j+l)(N*) (32)
Equation (32) can be used to interpret the bequest parameters derived by
Friedman and Warshawsky (1985) in a joy of giving framework. Friedman and
Warshawsky point out that the observed reluctance of most individuals in the
United States to purchase individual life annuities, and the concomitant
approximately flat age-wealth profiles of retired consumers, stand in sharp
contradiction to the standard (no bequest motive) life-cycle model of
1.3.1114
consumptionand saving behavior. Simulation of an extended model of life-
cycle saving and portfolio behavior, allowing explicitly for uncertain
lifetimes, Social Security, and empirically observed annuity prices, indicates
that an intentional bequest motive must be present in order to explain the
observed limited participation in annuity markets. Friedman and Warshawsky
derive the minimum values for the bequest motive parameter which will
eliminate purchases of individual annuities under various assumptions about
the gross interest rate, R, the proportion of Social Security in the average
retired individual's portfolio, 5, the degree of risk aversion and the degree
to which annuity prices exceed the actuarially fair prices. Their results,
which are reproduced in the top panel of Table 3, might explain the apparent
failure of most consumers to buy annuities as the consequence of apparently
strong bequest motives.
An alternative measure of the strength of the bequest motive is the
implied value of the altruism parameter ci.Since the expected present value
of Social Security income is not bequeathable, Social Security wealth is
appropriately treated as human, or non-property, wealth rather than as a
tangible asset. Because of the presence of human wealth, we use equation (32)
to calculate the altruism parameter. The bottom panel of Table 3 reports the
calculated values of ci using (32) with N30, L60, and B(1.01Y1.
The assumed values of R and the calculated values of ci are reported in Table
3. For the ratio of tangible property wealth to total wealth, 1/W, we use
1-S, where S is the share of Social Security wealth in total wealth reported
in the top panel of Table 3. Finally, the values of X are taken from the top
panel of Table 3. The picture which emerges from the bottom panel of Table 3
is quite different from that in the top panel. In all cases the degree of the
implied altruism parameter is quite small. In assessing these small values of
1.3.1-15—
a it must be kept in mind that the Friedman and Warshawsky calculations
produced a lower bound on the strength of the bequest motive. Additionally,
the present value of human wealth of future generations has been ignored. The
bequest motives may, therefore, be substantially larger than the implied lower
bounds presented in Table 3. Nevertheless, the findings indicate that given
the actual pricing of annuities, a weak altruistic bequest motive will be
sufficient to eliminate the purchase of private annuities.
VI. Conclusions
This paper analyzes the joy of giving bequest motive in which the utility
obtained from leaving a bequest depends only on the size of the bequest. It
exploits the fact that this formulation can be interpreted as a reduced form
of an altruistic bequest motive to derive a relation between the value of the
altruism parameter and the value of the joy of giving parameter. Using
previous discussions of an a priori range of plausible values for the altruism
parameter we then derive plausible restrictions on the joy of giving
parameter. We demonstrate that this parameter may well be orders of magnitude
larger than assumed in the existing literature.
Despite its analytic tractability, there has been some reluctance to use
the joy of giving formulation even in analyses where only a generic bequest
motive is necessary. This reluctance may owe to the difficulty of making
reasonable assumptions about, and in empirical work and simulation models
reasonable interpretations of, the joy of giving parameter. In removing this
difficulty, this paper takes an important step in interpreting empirical work
and simulation results which are directed at understanding actual economic
phenomena related to bequests.
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Footnotes
1For more general specifications of the utility from one's own
consumption, there may not exist any value of a for which the utility function
displays full altruism.
21f consumption takes place in continuous time, then the functional
equation (3) can be written as V(W3).r u(c(z))edz +eNa
If u( ) has the isoelastic form in (11), then it can be shown that
V(W3)
1 (W)1 where =[.r
exp{((-1 —1)r—)t}dt/
(i -aaexp{((-- —1)r -)N})j0.In the steady state ae_tJ =1so that
4' = exp{((-—1)r—)t}dt/(1—exp(_rN))]a.
1.3.1Table 1
Weights on Joy of Giving Function and Implied Degree of Altruism
811 R A
(a=.5) (a=1) (a=2) (a14)
.04 1.06 .56 1.114 14.96 100.99 143,076
.04 1.04 1. 1.80 10.49 356.76 412,807
.02 1.06 .32 2.01 7.47 142.29 58,940
.02 1.04 .56 2.86 15.80 524.71 600,160
.02 1.02 1. 14.91 43.70 3,1459.06 21,673,136
.01 1.06 .23 2.91 9.57 172.13 69,611
.01 1.014 .142 3.93 20.214 649.94 732,0)42
.01 1.02 .714 6.38 55.96 14,398.76 27,466,003
.01 1.01 1. 9.8)4 130.5322,964.63710,820,614
Source: Calculations based on equation (22) with N30, L60.
1.3.1Table 2
The Implied Degree of Altruism a
















a is calculated from (23).
1.3.1Table 3
Estimates of Bequest Motive Parameter X,
from Friedman and Warshawsky (1985)
S=.14 S=.5 S.6
R 1.01
c2 18 9 14
a=3 169 58 18 a4 V488 3143 714
R1.014
az2 10 5 3 a3 66 214 7
a=14 1419 105 22
Implied Valuesof Altruism Parameter
1/W .6 1/W .5 1/W=14
R= 1.01
a 2 .025 .019 .0114
a 3 .007 .005 .003
a 14 .002 .001 .001
R= 1.024
a 2 .031 .023 .022
a = 3 .013 .009 .005
a = 14 .005 .003 .002
Source: Top Panel -Friedmanand Warshaws[y (1985), Table 9; B = (1.01)_i
Bottom Panel -Equation(32) with B(1.01), N30, L60
X from Top Panel with 1/W = 1 -S.
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